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FLAT TAX, FAIR TAX: NEW HOPE FOR
REFORMING THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE
Although the idea of a flat-rate income tax is not new, until recently
the idea seemed little more than an exercise in economic theory. The
last few years, however, have witnessed an explosion of interest in major tax reform by prominent political figures of both parties.' The tax
reform movement appeared to reach its zenith during the summer of
1982. At that time twelve bills had been introduced before the 97th
Congress which called for a drastic revision of the Internal Revenue
Code.2
The furor over tax reform has died down somewhat since 1982. But
the perception on Capitol Hill that major reform is needed apparently
has not. As of August, 1983, ten of the
twelve tax-reform bills had been
3
reintroduced into the 98th Congress.
*

1.
2.

3.

James C. Murphy, third year student at Notre Dame Law School, provided research and
assisted in writing the sections on objections to the present tax system, the possibility of
reform, and tax reform and the deficit. Gregory S. Foiley, third year student at Notre Dame
Law School, researched the material for the sections on tax reform, the deficit, and the
information on charitdble and home mortgage interest deductions. The author wishes to
express his gratitude for their contributions.
The sponsors of the tax bills currently before Congress, provided in note 6, infra, represent a
wide portion of the political spectrum.
S. 2817, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 59979 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1982), introduced by
Senator Bradley, D-N.J.; H.R. 6944, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H5265 (daily ed.
Aug. 5, 1982), introduced by Representative Gephardt, D-Mo.; S. 2887, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
128 CONG. REc. SI 1206 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1982), introduced by Senator Mitchell, D-Me.; S.
2557, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S5717 (daily ed. May 20, 1982), introduced by
Senator Quayle, R-Ind.; S. 2147, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S1275 (daily ed. May
1, 1982), introduced by Senator DeConcini, D-Ariz.; H.R. 6628, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
CONG. REC. H3666 (daily ed. June 17, 1982), introduced by Representative Dannemeyer, RCal.; H.R. 6070, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H1427 (daily ed. April 5, 1982),
introduced by Representative Panetta, D-Cal.; H.R. 4821, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG.
REc. H7729 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981), introduced by Representative Hansen, R-Idaho; H.R.
6741, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H4047 (daily ed. July 13, 1982), introduced by
Representative Dreier, R-Cal.; H.R. 6352, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H2048
(daily ed. May 11, 1982), introduced by Representative Paul, R-Tex.; S. 2200, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S2088 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1982), introduced by Senator Helms, RN.C.; H.R. 5513, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H406 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1982),
introduced by Representative Crane, R-Ill.
S. 1421, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S7838-45 (daily ed. June 8, 1983), introduced
by Senator Bradley, D-N.J.; H.R. 3271, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H3846 (daily
ed. June 9, 1983), introduced by Representative Gephardt, D-Mo.; S. 1767, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S 11713 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983), introduced by Senator Mitchell, DMe.; S. 1040, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S4556 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1983), introduced by Senator Quayle, R-Ind.; S. 557, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S1509-10
(daily ed. Feb. 23, 1983), introduced by Senator DeConcini, D-Ariz.; H.R. 2520, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H2077-79 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1983), introduced by Representative
Panetta, D-Cal.; H.R. 170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H44 (daily ed. Jan. 3,
1983), introduced by Representative Hansen, R-Idaho; H.R. 1770, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REC. H774 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1983), introduced by Representative Dreier, R-Cal.;
H.R. 2137, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H1264 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1983), intro-
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This note will set forth the criticisms most commonly directed at the
current tax code, delineate the major provisions of the two bills currently before Congress which have obtained the most support as viable
alternatives to the present system, and analyze the obstacles presently
facing each bill.
OBJECTIONS TO THE PRESENT TAX SYSTEM
Economic Inefficiency
A widely accepted goal for a tax system is economic efficiency.
That is, the process of raising revenue should not interfere with the
normal market incentives for engaging in business activity, except
where Congress so intends.4 Yet the combination of numerous deductions and a high marginal rate - fifty percent in the highest individual
tax bracket - have unintentionally combined to create powerful incentives to allocate income to investments which shelter funds from taxation.5 These incentives have the undesirable effect, first, of preventing
the accumulation of savings, and second, of altering the allocation of
resources which a free market would otherwise create.
Regardless of whether allowing the market to allocate resources is
desirable, the current situation is not. The effect of the tax system on
resource allocation not only interferes with the market, but it precludes
rational congressional action to influence resource distribution, since
any policy adopted must compete with the unintended incentives provided by the tax system.
The effect of high marginal tax rates also affects the labor supply,
although that effect is debatable.6 High tax rates may make work less
attractive than leisure; yet, from another perspective, high tax rates require additional work to reach a particular income level. One recent
study indicates that most male workers, given the opportunity, would
choose to earn more income rather than increase their leisure. 7 In addition, recent falling levels of industrial productivity have also been
duced by Representative Paul, R-Tex.; H.R. 542, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H93
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 1983), introduced by Representative Crane, R-Ill. Senator Helms and Representative Dannemeyer, as of August, 1983, had not reintroduced their bills.
4.

STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS
RELATING TO BROADENING THE BASE AND LOWERING THE RATES OF THE INCOME TAX 5
(Jt. Comm. Print 1982) (hereinafter cited as STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION).

5.

Senator Bradley, D-N.J., observed:
[W]hile we profess to believe in the free market system, section after section of the tax
code tells new investors what lines of business to enter, tells existing corporations how
to go about their work, and puts a heavy tax on the profits of successful and productive corporations.
Senator Bradley, Remarks to the National Press Club, reprinted in 129 CONG. REc. S7846
(daily ed. June 8, 1983).
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REVISING THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 32-33 (July
1983) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE].
Id. at 33, citing Hausman, Labor Supply, in How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 2783 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman eds. 1981).

6.

7.
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well documented.' During the years when America's marginal tax
rates and tax code were growing most rapidly, the level of savings and
investment had fallen far behind that of other major industrial
countries. 9
Complexity
The current Internal Revenue Code has also been accused of generating an entire industry devoted to tax shelters and tax services by lawyers and accountants." ° A majority of taxpayers using a long-form
return need help in preparing their tax returns, " while forty percent of
all taxpayers using the short-form 1040A sought assistance in 1977.12
The situation is even worse for businesses. Many businesses require
expensive professional help to manage their tax affairs. Larger businesses must allocate hundreds of thousands of dollars to comply with
Internal Revenue Code provisions.
Other costs must be added to the waste of resources, including the
costs of administering, enforcing, and litigating the Internal Revenue
Code, which at the present time comprises hundreds of pages, with
hundreds more pages of interpretive regulations. Ridding the tax code
of its "baroque complexity""' would "release the talents and energies
that are now directed into figuring
out tax avoidance schemes and
' 4
counseling others in their use."'
Fairness
The current tax system fails a fundamental fairness test, that is, that
equal incomes should be treated the same. A Harris Poll revealed that
eighty-six percent of Americans believed that many people avoid paying their fair share of income tax.'- The treatment of income under the
Internal Revenue Code, with its vast number of deductions, credits,
and exemptions, allows knowledgeable taxpayers to structure their
transactions so as to benefit from tax preferences for certain kinds of
income. Those who can afford to purchase homes may shelter from
taxation the interest paid on their mortgages, 16 as well as, in many circumstances, capital gains incurred in selling a home;' 7 those who
8.

SIMON, REFORMING THE INCOME TAX SYSTEM 4 (1981).

9.

Id. at 3.

10.

HALL AND RABUSHKA, Low TAX, FLAT TAX, SIMPLE TAX 13 (1983); SIMON, REFORMING
THE INCOME TAX SYSTEM 23 (1981).

11.

FatRate Tax.: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
222 (statement of Senator Domenici, R-N.M.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings).
SIMON, supra note 8, at 23.
See Washington Post, June 3, 1982, at A18, col. 1.
Id.
4 Loss of Faith in the Progressive Tax, Bus. WK. 15, Sept. 6, 1982. The article included a
Harris Poll revealing that American people have lost faith in the ability of the tax system to
operate equitably.
I.R.C. § 163 (CCH 1983).
Id. § 1034 (a).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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choose to or must rent have no such advantage. Investors in state and
local bonds are not taxed on the interest income received;18 investors in
most other securities must pay tax on their interest income.' 9 Those
who can persuade their employers to compensate them with fringe benefits may pay little or no tax on these benefits, although they are clearly
a form of compensation. 20 Even the tax enforcement system discriminates. Capital gains are not subject to withholding, thus such gains
have greater potential to unlawfully avoid taxation, whereas wage and
salary income is subject to withholding automatically. 2'
Tax Evasion
Even if sound policy reasons justify the tax preferences cited above,
a widespread perception of unfairness may be driving an increasingly
large portion of the economy underground. Studies estimate that anywhere from $100 billion to $250 billion of income escapes taxation annually.2 2 Among farmers, professionals, and other self-employed
groups, unreported income is estimated to be extraordinarily high.23
Many observers believe that perceived unfairness and cheating are rising together, threatening the very basis of the nation's voluntary, selfassessing tax system.2 4 Apparently, those who have the ability to avoid
taxes legally, through "loopholes," do so. Some who cannot afford the
services of lawyers and accountants, or lack the income to benefit from
those services, increasingly escape taxation by cheating.
The Tax Code and Social Policy
Conservatives have long deplored the use of the tax code as a tool
of social policy, pointing out that its primary function is to raise revenue.
Since 1913, however, when passage of the sixteenth amendment 26 authorized the income tax, increased use of the tax code to
implement social policy has paralleled the increased role of government in managing the nation's economic and social welfare. The Internal Revenue Code for 1984 contains hundreds of pages of complex
rules that seek to encourage particular activities. The disparities in the
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. § 103.
Id. § 61(a)(4).
Gross income includes income realized in any form. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (CCH 1983).
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 24.
See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF TREASURY, ESTIMATES OF INCOME UNRE-

PORTED ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, (1979) (hereinafter cited as INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE); Gutmann, The SubterraneanEconomy, FIN. ANALYSIS J. 26 (Nov.-Dec.

1977).
23.
24.
25.
26.

See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 22, at 96.
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 131 (testimony of Fred Wertheimer, President of
Common Cause), pt. 1, at 222 (testimony of Sen. Domenici, R-N.M.). See also HALL AND
RABUSHKA, supra note 10, at 10.
See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 174 (1962). Friedman argued
against the use of the tax code to redistribute income and advocated a flat-rate tax scheme
very similar to that put forth by Hall and Rabushka.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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treatment of income attempt to accomplish ostensibly legitimate objectives, 27 yet the accumulation of preferential tax provisions has resulted
in the inefficiences and unfairness of the current system.
William E. Simon has argued:
A far better mechanism for promoting economic and social objectives, is to do so explicitly through the expenditure side of the budget.
Here such support would be more visible and under closer scrutiny. It
could thus be channeled more directly to the targeted areas. To attempt to achieve the same end with the tax system is to adopt a shotgun
approach. Benefits flow willy-nilly to those who need them as well as
to those who do not. The costs of such tax manipulations, in terms of
forgone revenues and misallocated resources, may exceed the value of
their benefits.28
Although subsidies would require costly administrative agencies for
disbursement, whereas tax expenditures utilize the established tax
code,29 the Senate Finance Committee Hearings revealed widespread
acceptance of Simon's views. All of the tax-reform bills were discussed
and a majority of the witnesses reached substantial agreement on two
points: the need to broaden the base of taxpayers and the need to lower
the tax rate.3" Significantly, these propositions received support not
only from conservatives, but also from witnesses such as Joseph A.
Pechman of the Brookings Institution, who testified that "the source of
the complexity is the attempt by Congress and most administrations to
do too much with the income tax",3" and by Fred Wertheimer, president of Common Cause, who testified that "continued support [for
worthy purposes] can be provided'3 2in more direct forms, if warranted,
such as through grants or loans."
THE POSSIBILITY OF REFORM
Three goals for a new tax system emerged from the Senate Finance
Committee Hearings: first, taxes should distort economic activity as
little as possible; second, the cost and complexity of complying with the
current tax code must be reduced; and third, similarly situated taxpayers should shoulder a similar and fair portion of the tax burden.3 3
While these goals are far from novel, they do provide a common
ground from which to evaluate alternative tax systems.
Two of the ten bills before the 98th Congress have emerged as the
most detailed, discussed, and heavily promoted. One, the Fair Tax Act
of 1983,34 is co-sponsored by Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) and Repre27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

For example, promoting home ownership or financing local government.
SIMON, supra note 8, at 15.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 7.
Id. at 8.
Hearings, supra note 11, pt. 2,at 5.
Id. at 137.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 4,at 3-7.
S. 1421 and H.R. 3271, supra note 3.
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35
sentative Richard Gephardt (D-Mo.) and the other, a flat-tax plan,
was formulated by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka of the Hoover
Institution, and is sponsored by Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.).
The principal differences between the Bradley-Gephardt and HallRabushka proposals are the deductions allowed and rate structures imposed. The Hall-Rabushka proposal eliminates virtually all current deductions, credits, and exemptions, except for a personal allowance,
while the Bradley-Gephardt proposal retains a significant number of
popular deductions. The Hall-Rabushka bill imposes a single "flat"
rate on all income, whereas the Bradley-Gephardt bill uses a graduated
rate structure for personal income and a separate tax on corporate income. A summary of the essential provisions of each bill follows.

The Bradley-Gephardt

Bill

36

Under this bill, taxpayers with incomes below $25,000, or joint incomes below $40,000, would pay a tax of 14% on taxable income. Income between $25,000 and $37,500, or joint income between $40,000
and $65,000, would be subject to a 12% surtax, resulting in an effective
rate of 26%. Income above $37,500, or above $65,000 on a joint return,
would carry a 16% surtax, for an effective rate of 30%. Married persons
filing separately would pay one half the joint return amount.
The Bradley-Gephardt proposal allows personal exemptions including $1,600 for a single taxpayer, $3,200 for joint taxpayers, and
$1,800 for a single head of household. The bill also grants exemptions
of $ 1,000 for each dependent, for each blind taxpayer, and for each
elderly taxpayer. Individuals do not pay tax on their first $3,000 of
income if they file singly, or the first $6,000 if they file jointly.
The Bradley-Gephardt plan would tax corporations with a flat
thirty percent rate. The bill would repeal the minimum corporate tax.
The plan would eliminate a large number of deductions, credits,
and exclusions. Several would remain, however, including deductions
for home mortgage interest, charitable contributions, state and local income and real property taxes, payments to IRA's and Keogh plans, and
employee business expenses. The bill would also exclude from income
veterans' benefits, Social Security benefits, and interest on general obligation bonds.
The Bradley-Gephardt proposal would implement a new depreciation method whereby plant and equipment would be placed into one of
35.
36.

S. 557, supra note 3.
S. 1421 and H.R. 3271, supra note 3.
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six classes. The depreciation ratio37 is designed so that "the present
value of depreciation deductions is approximately equal to the present
value of economic depreciation at a 10% discount rate." 38
1139
The Hall-Rabushka Bi

Doctors Hall and Rabushka believe raising revenue through taxes
should be uncomplicated. Thus, their bill contains few provisions.
Under their flat-rate plan, a nineteen percent tax would apply to all
individual and corporate income. Dividends and capital gains from
investments generally would not be taxable, thereby eliminating double
taxation of corporate profits.
The only deductions from gross income that the Hall-Rabushka
proposal retains would be personal allowances, whereby individual
taxpayers could deduct $3,800, joint filers $6,200, and single heads of
households $5,000. Each dependent would entitle a taxpayer to a $750
deduction.
The flat-rate bill would tax businesses separately, and would allow
a deduction only for the costs of doing business, including purchases of
goods and services and compensation to employees. In addition, capital costs for plant and new equipment may be written off against gross
income in the year of purchase. Net losses may be carried forward and
applied to the following year's taxable income.
Hall and Rabushka's plan punctuates its simplicity by requiring
business and individual taxpayers to file on postcard-size forms.4"
ANALYSIS OF THE BRADLEY-GEPHARDT AND HALL-RABUSHKA
PROPOSALS

The Hall-Rabushka and Bradley-Gephardt proposals both have equitable, economic, and political rough spots reflecting upon their feasibility. The heart of the debate between advocates of the HallRabushka and Bradley-Gephardt bills is whether tax reforms should
strive to achieve fairness.
Not all tax-reform supporters agree that equity or fairness is a tax37.

The asset classes and depreciation rates for equipment are as follows:
ADR Midpoint
Under 5

5.0 to 8.5
9.0 to 14.5
15 to 24
25 to 35
Over 35 and Structures

Class Life
4

6
10
18
28
40

Office of Senator Bradley, D-N.J., Press Release (April 14, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Brad-

38.
39.
40.

ley Press Release]. See also S. 1421, supra note 3, § 168; H.R. 3271, supra note 3, § 168.
Id.
S. 557, supra note 3.
The postcard-size form would be approximately the size as reprinted below. An individual
would file a form similar to the following:
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reform issue.4 ' Norman B. Ture, former Under Secretary of the Treasury Department for Tax and Economic Affairs, believes that equity is
"an elusive and non-productive" approach to tax reform.42 He argues
that neutrality should take priority over the various goals of tax proposHALL-RABUSiKA SIMPLIFIED FLAT-RATE TAX FORM
Form 1

Individual Compensation Tax

u z~
,,to..
¢

o,

,

o..

s.,,

1982

Your occupation i
Spouse s occupathonJ=,

1 Compensation as reported by employer ..........................

2 Other wage income, including pensions ....................
3 Total compensation (line 1plus line 2) .........................
4 Personal allowance ............... : ........................
(a) L $6200 for m arried filing jointly ..........................
(b) E $3800 for single .....................................
(c) El $5600 for single head of household ......................
5 Number of dependents, not including spouse ..................
6 Personal allowances for dependents (line 5 multiplied by $750)
7 Total personal allowances (line 4 plus line 6).................
8 Taxable compensation (line 3 less line 7)........................
9 Tax (19% of line 8) ...................................
10 Tax withheld by employer
..............................
11 Tax due (line 9 less line 10,if positive) ............................12 Refund due (line 10 less line 9, if positive) .................

........................

2_ __
3
................ .....
4
.................. .....
4 b) ..................
.....
c ........................
6

0
I
12

On the other side of the postcard, a business entity would file a form similar to the one
reprinted below.

Form 2

Business Tax

1 Gross revenue from sales .....................................
1
2 A llowable costs ..............................................
(a) Purchases of goods, services, and materials .................. 2(a)
(b) Wages, salaries, and pensions..
..................
b
(c) Purchases of capital equipment, structures, and land ........... 2(
3 Total allowable costs (sum of lines 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) ................ 3
4
4 Taxable income (line 1 less line 3) .............................
5 Tax (19% of line 4) ...........................................
5
6
6 Carry-forvard from 1981 ......................................
7 Interest on carry-forward (14% of line 6) ......................
.
8 Carry-forward into 1982 (line 6 plus line 7) ....................
8
9 Tax due (line 5 less line 8, if positive) ..........................
9
10 Carry-forward to 1983 (line 8 less line 5, if positive) ..............
10
41.

42.

1982

......................
.......
.............

...................

For example, a National Taxpayer Union spokesman declared that "equity is a matter of
opinion." Fessler, Flat-Rate Tax Advanced as Radical Curefor Problems ofExisting Revenue
System, CONG. Q. 1333 (June 5, 1982).
TURE, The Flat Tax Challenge 4 (The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Monograph No.
212, Sept. 21, 1982).
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als.43 Other tax policy analysts note that fairness underlies the deeply
engrained tax concept of vertical equity, that is, the concept that taxpayers in higher income groups should pay a proportionately greater
share of their income in taxes. 44 The progressive rate structure of the
current income tax code purports to embody this long-held principle.4 5
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) economic analyst agrees that
vertical equity is a subjective concept, 46 and that many tax experts consider such a fairness standard too arbitrary to form the basis of a tax
structure. 47 But while flat-rate tax proponents believe that tax policy
decisions based on equity entail imprecise judgments, the CRS analyst
contends that the flat-rate tax argument in favor of proportional tax
rates, rather than progressive rates, also stems from arbitrary assumptions about vertical equity.4 8 Ultimately, which bill one supports seems
to depend upon whether one believes vertical equity should influence
tax reform. 49 A discussion of the Bradley-Gephardt bill's adoption and
the Hall-Rabushka bill's exclusion of progressive rates can explain
what role the fairness issue plays in either bill.
Flat Versus Progressive Rates
While testifying before the Senate Finance Committee, Fred Wertheimer, president of Common Cause, emphasized that progressivity is
43.

44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.

Mr. Ture states:
[Nbo one would design an unfair tax. Even with the best intent and greatest effort to
produce the fairest possible tax, however, there is likely to be little confirmation of
success. If for no other reason than that we do not know what tax fairness really is it
should take a back seat to other criteria, principally neutrality, in the design of a flatrate, broad based tax.
Id. at 10.
Esenwein,.4n Overview ofthe Issues Concerning a Flat-Rate Income Tax, TAX NOTES 950
(June 21, 1982).
See I.R.C. § 1 (CCH 1983).
Esenwein, supra note 44.
[Vlertical equity is a highly subjective concept because it is based on the assumption
of declining marginal utility of income. That is, a dollar of income is considered to be
more valuable to a lower income individual (who's more likely to spend it on necessities) than it is to an upper income individual (who is more likely to spend it on nonnecessities).
Id.
Tannenwald, Progressivityin Income Taxation.- .4 Pro-ConDiscussion, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 3 (Dec. 28, 1976).
Fred Wertheimer of Common Cause before the Senate Finance Committee stressed the need
for fairness in reforming the tax system. Hearings, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 131. Dr. Alvin
Rabushka believes that: "[p]eople outside the 'Hill' don't care nearly as much about distribution shifts as they do about simplicity and the knowledge that their neighbor pays the
same in taxes for the same amount of income." Interview with Dr. Alvin Rabushka, Senior
Fellow, Hoover Institution, at Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 8, 1983).
Representative Gephardt, on the other hand, has complained that increasingly casting the
tax reform debate in terms of the effect on the distribution of the tax burden, rather than in
terms of reform and fairness, would make tax reform impossible. Bernick, Reagan Asks
Treasury to Study Tax Simplification, TAX NOTES 78 (Oct. 4, 1982). Louis Alan Talley, CRS
research analyst in taxation, said "the 'proper' amount of progressivity an income tax should
entail is a judgment which depends upon personal notions regarding equity and social utility." Talley, Estimatesof Flat Income Tax Rates Using Various Tax Bases, TAX NOTES 956
(June 21, 1982).
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a fundamental element of fairness in a tax system.5 ° Common Cause, a
middle-income taxpayers' lobbying group, finds flat-rate tax systems
inherently unfair.5 ' Wertheimer says that a graduated rate structure
can solve the flat-rate's unfairness.5 2 Common Cause supports the
Bradley-Gephardt bill, 3 with minor adjustments.5 4
Citizens for Tax Justice's director for federal tax policy, Robert McIntyre, perceives that this country's capitalism rests on the underlying
assumption that "winners and losers" inevitably result in society.," To
lessen the impact on those who lose, McIntyre suggests that the American system should maintain "a tax approach that tells the winners they
have to6 pay more to support the system under which they have done so
5

well."

Common Cause and Citizens for Tax Justice, as well as other interest groups,57 agree that progressivity plays a crucial role in a tax system's perceived fairness.5" These groups support the Bradley-Gephardt
proposal, or favor it over a flat-rate tax, because of its four-bracket,
graduated rates. The concept of "ability to pay" runs throughout arguments supporting the fair tax.5 9 Senator Bradley (D-N.J.) explained
that "[wle have taken the progressive route because we believe that
someone who has benefitted substantially from our economic system

Common Cause defines progressivity in generally accepted terms: higher income taxpayers
should pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes. This is also known as the ability to
pay principal. Hearings,supra note 11, pt. 2, at 135-36.
51. Id. at 141.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 142. The Bradley-Gephardt bill maintains progressivity with its two-tier rate structure,
whereby allowable deductions and exemptions affect only the 14% bracket. Income which
exceeds that bracket's income limit and falls into the higher brackets is not subject to the
deductions. According to Wertheimer, "this further adds to their system's fairness by ensuring that a dollar of deductible expense has the same value for all taxpayers, regardless of
income level." Id.
54. Common Cause notes that the Bradley-Gephardt bill hopes to maintain the degree of
progressivity in the current code, which includes the 1981 tax cuts. Because Common Cause
believes that the 1981 cuts gave "disproportionate benefits to upper-income taxpayers," the
organization advocates using the pre-1981 progression and tax liability distribution as standards. Id.
55. McIntyre, Flat-Rate Talk, THE NEW REPUBLIC 21 (July 19-26, 1982). Citizens for Tax Justice is a public interest group representing labor, lower-income, and middle-income groups.
56. Id. McIntyre continues that "free-market liberals" believe progressive rates can help "mitigate the concentration of wealth and power which, unless kept in check, undercuts the basic
rationale for the capitalist system."
57. The AFL-CIO, for example, argues that "fundamental tax justice requires the retention of a
progressive income tax rate schedule." AFL-CIO, Issue Alert!: The Flat-Rate Tax Hoax 2
(March 3, 1983) (fact sheet 98-10). The national labor organization goes so far as to take the
position on the Bradley-Gephardt bill that "although this proposal is less damaging than the
flat-rate tax, it too moves away from the principle of progressive taxation which, without its
loopholes, is far preferable to either of these two proposals." ld. The AFL-CIO believes
that the key to tax reform is not lowering the rates, which they perceive as a wealthy taxpayer
boon and broadening the base, but eliminating certain loopholes and arbitrary tax preferences. Id. See also Fessler, supra note 41, in which former IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz
argues that those who earn more can afford to pay a greater share of their income in taxes
because those extra dollars are not being used for food, clothing, and shelter.
58. See Hitchner, Memorandumfor Governing Board" Reforming the FederalIncome Tax Sys50.

tem, COMMON CAUSE (July 1982).

59.

Hearings, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 135-36.
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should give back a little more than people who are struggling from
paycheck to paycheck. That is a longstanding policy in America
.... ,60 Advocates of the Bradley-Gephardt bill fear that elimination
of progressive tax rates under a flat-rate proposal would cause a major
shift in the tax burden distribution, thereby decreasing the burden on
the wealthy and increasing it on middle-income taxpayers. 6' Others
dispute whether flat-rate tax systems, specifically the Hall-Rabushka
proposal, eliminate progressivity in the tax structure. Also, some commentators disagree that progressivity is as cherished as advocates of the
Bradley-Gephardt bill contend.
Progressivityand the Hall-Rabushka Proposal
Doctors Hall and Rabushka point out that their flat-rate tax proposal maintains progressivity as long as that term refers to higher-income
taxpayers paying proportionately larger shares of their incomes in
taxes. 62 Although the Hall-Rabushka bill seems to do away with
progressivity because it applies the same tax rate to all income groups,
the bill's authors contend that in comparison to how the current tax
system actually operates, with all of its deductions and exceptions, their
flat tax is more progressive. 63 Ultimately, they say, the Hall-Rabushka
proposal achieves a progressive result. Some analysts dispute that a
truly progressive tax system can result from the adoption of any flatrate tax.6
Robert Tannenwald, tax analyst at the CRS, recounts a slightly different argument made by flat-tax advocates. According to Tannenwald, these "flat-raters" imply that the current tax system sets the
60.

129 CONG. REC. S7846 (daily ed. June 8, 1983). S. 1421, supra note 3, at 7836.

61.

See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 11, pt. 2, at 135; AFL-CIO, supra note 57; McIntyre, supra

note 55.
62.

HALL AND RABUSHKA, supra note 10, at 84. Dr. Rabushka prefers the term "graduated"

over "progressive" to describe a rate structure that has increasing tax rates throughout sev63.

eral income brackets. Interview with Dr. Alvin Rabushka, supra note 49.
HALL AND RABUSHKA, supra note 10, at 84-85. The authors illustrate the progressivity of
their flat-rate tax proposal:

Income

Effective Tax Rate as
A Percentage of Income

$10,000

(19% Flat-Rate Tax)
4.4%

9.2
15,500
11.7
20,000
14.1
30,000
15.2
40,000
16.1
50,000
Id. at 85. Because of the personal exemptions and dependency deductions, the effective rate
of tax rises and approaches 19% as income increases.
64. Gregg Esenwein, an economic analyst at the Congressional Research Service, states:
Hence, a flat-rate tax coupled with an income exemption is not incompatible with
the concept of progressivity. However, regardless of the particular provision for exemptions, adoption of a flat-rate tax would in all probability reduce progressivity
when compared to the current income tax system and hence could result in an overall
tax burden that is regressive.
Esenwein, supra note 44, at 950.
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guidelines for future tax rate structures. In operation, the current system provides little or no progression. Therefore, the argument concludes, a flat-rate tax reflects reality, offers an "outright recognition of
proportionality," while avoiding the morass of multiple brackets and
numerous deductions.6 5 This argument highlights the current Internal
Revenue Code's inadequate implementation of progressivity and assumes that if taxpayers want the present progressivity, they will have it
under a flat-rate tax regardless of its non-progressive label.66
Should a Tax System Include Progressivity?
Not all tax reformers believe the tax structure should be progressive. In fact, some reformers vehemently oppose the concept as unfair
and confiscatory.67 For example, the National Taxpayers Union
(NTU) believes the current progressive rates penalize those who earn
more money by assessing a higher tax rate against additional dollars
earned. This conservative lobbying organization claims the progressive
rate penalty discourages productivity and work
effort, and NTU
68
blames it in part for the recent economic slump.
Senator DeConcini (D-Ariz.) has said that a low, flat-rate structure
would not suppress the incentive to produce as taxpayers moved up the
income scale. DeConcini believes that the progressive marginal rates
69
of the current tax code inhibit workers to produce and earn more.
Additionally, a recent Harris Poll showed that some taxpayers have
lost faith in the progressive tax system because of the deductions and
exclusions available to those who could afford tax lawyers and accountants.7 ° The poll indicated that many taxpayers want tax reform, but
with the reservation that reform should stop where it begins taking
away one's own available tax preferences.7 The ambivalence exhib65.
66.

67.
68.
69.

70.

71.

Tannenwald, supra note 48, at 3-4.
Some analysts do not agree that the current code is not progressive in effect. Tannenwald
cites a study by Richard A. and Peggy B. Musgrave, which determined that in 1968 the
effective individual income tax rates ranged from two percent for people with incomes under
$4,000 to 18.5% for taxpayers with $92,000 plus incomes. Id.
Edwin Meese has said that "the progressive rate structure is immoral." Fessler, supra note
41.
Id.
Senator DeConcini's comments originated from his impressions of a film produced by Dr.
Rabushka on Hong Kong's economic system. Senator DeConcini explains that Hong Kong's
low, nearly flat tax rates which removed an impediment to productivity stimulated his interest inimplementing a similar rate structure in the U.S. tax system.
Dr. Rabushka has remarked that by removing the penalty for earning extra money, people would work more and have more money to save and invest. After the elimination of
most deductions and loopholes, people would invest in productive areas of our economy
rather than in nonproductive tax avoidance schemes. HALL AND RABUSHKA, supra note 10,
at 94.
The survey then asked if every taxpayer should pay the same percentage of income in taxes.
Forty-eight percent of those polled favored the same rate for all, 42% opposed the proposition. The lowest income group polled narrowly favored retaining the present system. A Loss
of Faith in the Progressive Tax, supra note 15.
According to the poll, 62% of those surveyed favor a single 14% tax rate for everyone, along
with elimination of nearly all deductions, while 25% opposed such a measure. However,
"when it comes to giving up treasured tax breaks, Americans change their tune drastically.
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ited in the poll and the divergent treatment of progressivity in both the
Bradley-Gephardt and Hall-Rubushka proposals underscore the valueoriented nature of tax reform. As Tannenwald stated "[o]ne's beliefs
concerning the appropriate degree of progressivity in federal income
taxation are important components of his image of a just society. The
issue of progressivity ultimately must be resolved on the basis of value
judgments, not on deductions based on objective laws."72
Distribution of the Tax Burden
The Bradley-Gephardt and Hall-Rabushka bills differ significantly
in their effects on distribution of the tax burden. Many predictions
about either bill's effects on specific income groups stem from speculative income projections. The Hall-Rabushka proposal has undergone
more critical analysis than the Bradley-Gephardt bill concerning its
shift of tax burden from the upper- to middle-income class. The perceived inequity of the redistribution is the strongest objection to a flatrate tax; thus, this issue merits considerable discussion under both the
Hall-Rabushka and Bradley-Gephardt bills.
The Bradley-GephardtBill
An advocate of the Bradley-Gephardt proposal, Common Cause,
suggests that tax reform analysis should focus on how proposed systems
will affect the distribution of tax liabilities among individuals in different income classes, as well as among the income classes.7 3 Senator
Bradley (D-N.J.) explains that "throughout [our] bill, the changes are
designed. . . to raise approximately the same revenues now expected
[in 1985] under existing law and all of this would be done without
changing the tax burden for any income group."74 Common Cause
cites figures which show that the Bradley-Gephardt proposal will not
significantly change the proportionate burden of the total federal income tax per income group.7 Common Cause refers to these figures as
tentative "preliminary estimates."76
For example, more than 70% of the people polled want to keep the mortgage interest deduction." Id.
72.
73.
74.

75.

Tannenwald, supra note 48, at 25.
Hearings,supra note 11, pt. 2, at 135.
Bradley Press Release, supra note 37, at 4. Representative Gephardt adds: "[o]ur plan does
nothing to change the tax obligations of various income groups." Address by Richard
Gephardt, U.S. Representative, National Press Club, in Washington, D.C. (April 14, 1983).
COMMON CAUSE, Resolution on Federal Tax Reform 18 (July 31, 1982). The figures below
project the tax distribution for 1985 if Bradley and Gephardt's Fair Tax is enacted:

Expanded Income
$5,000-10,000

40,000-50,000
1,000,000 +
76. Id.

Percentage of Total
Federal Income Taxes
1.6 current law

1.5
13.7
14.2
1.7
2.0

Fair Tax
current law
Fair Tax
current law
Fair Tax
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The Bradley-Gephardt proposal purports to distribute the tax burden in the same way as the current tax law, while closing many loopholes and eliminating preferred tax treatment such as the capital gains
deduction. The bill also promises to raise the same amount of tax revenue.7 7 These provisions would shift the tax burden among taxpayers
within the same income group.78 Under the Bradley-Gephardt bill
those taxpayers who benefitted most from exclusions, deductions, exemptions, and credits under the current law would experience the largest tax increase.7 9 Those taxpayers who do not currently take many
deductions will pay less taxes. Senator Bradley estimates that the latter
group totals approximately seventy percent of all taxpayers.8 °
Advocates of the Bradley-Gephardt proposal have not presented
facts concerning how many people within each income level will have
gains or losses. 8' United States Chamber of Commerce tax policy analyst Kenneth D. Simonson determined that most taxpayers would pay
Bradley-Gephardt's fourteen percent bottom rate, which is less than
what most of those people now pay in taxes. Lower-income workers,
however, will have to pay higher payroll taxes because the BradleyGephardt bill eliminates employer-provided health and insurance plan
income exclusions. 82 Ironically, the Bradley-Gephardt proposal, intended to alleviate the income tax burden of lower income workers,
may result in higher taxes for that group.
The Hall-Rabushka Bill
Congressional Budget Office tax analyst Joseph Minarik summarizes the distribution problem with the Hall-Rabushka proposal: a flatrate tax must set a low enough rate to encourage wealthy taxpayers to
forego their deductions and other tax preferences. Most flat-tax plans,
such as the Hall-Rabushka bill, increase the existing personal exemptions to prevent the poor from having to pay taxes. Thus, with tax
revenues lost at the upper and lower end of the income scale, "it is the
77.
78.

Bradley Press Release, supra note 37, at 4.
Hitchner, Reforming the FederalIncome Tax System, 18, 19 (Common Cause Internal Memorandum) (July 1982).
79. Id.
80. Bradley Press Release, supra note 37, at 5.
81. Before Senator Bradley and Representative Gephardt revised their bill to arrive at the "Fair
Tax Act of 1983," the U.S. Chamber of Commerce noted that the bill's sponsors did not
provide firm data on how the tax burden distribution would remain unchanged among income groups. Simonson, Director of Federal Budget Policy, The Bradley-Gephardt "Fair
Tax, " at 2.
82. Id.
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middle that is left holding the bag." 3 Minarik demonstrates that a flatrate system would shift a major share of the tax burden from the
$50,000-plus income taxpayers to the $10,000-$50,000 income group. 4
Tax distribution figures show that the 1979 median income per tax
return was approximately $12,000.85 Assuming a 14.5% flat-rate tax in
that year, taxpayers below the median income level would have borne
18% of the total individual tax paid, compared with the 6.9% of the
total that they actually paid. 6 According to Gregg Esenwein of the
CRS, any flat-rate tax proposal would result in a redistribution similar
to those figures. 87 "[Uinless some form of low to middle income relief
were included (say an exemption of a portion of income or a tax credit)
a flat-rate income tax would produce a tax burden which would fall
more heavily on lower to middle income taxpayers than the present
system."8 8 The Hall-Rabushka plan provides no tax credits, and aims
its exemptions at the poor. The Chamber of Commerce declares that
the Hall-Rabushka proposal's "basic exemption level would help out
taxpayers at the bottom, but necessarily increases the burden on the
middle still further."8 9 Finally, many of the largest deductions frequently used by the middle class would be eliminated by the HallRabushka plan. Loss of these deductions adds to the total percentage
of income a middle-income taxpayer would pay in taxes. 9°
Hall and Rabushka frankly admit that their plan would increase
many people's taxes. 9 ' They emphasize, however, that "quickly everyone will benefit from the increased economic activity that will accompany a dramatic improvement in the incentives facing the most critical
Fessler, supra note 41, at 1333. Similarly, Common Cause complains: "[t]he most important
fact to recognize about the flat-rate tax proposals . . . is that they would redistribute the tax
burden away from the high-income taxpayers and onto the middle class." Hearings, supra
note 11,pt. 2, at 140.
84. Hitchner, supra note 78, at 19-20. Moreover, taxpayers with $15,000-$20,000 incomes would
experience a tax increase of 7.7% compared with the current law's liability, and those in the
$20,000-$30,000 income group would have an increase of 9.3%. At the same time, $200,000plus-income taxpayers would save 27.7% in taxes under the flat rate. These percentage increases and decreases are in comparison with the current law. Id
85. The First-RateTax." An Old Idea with New Appeal, Bus. WK., July 19, 1982, at 130-31.

83.

86.
87.

Id.
Esenwein, supra note 44, at 974.

88.

Id. Because the current tax system is slightly progressive, Esenwein concludes that the overall tax burden could be regressive after implementing a flat rate. Id. at 950.

89.

Hearings,supra note 11, pt. 2, at 214 (statement of Kenneth Simonson, Senior Tax Econo-

mist, United States Chamber of Commerce).
90. Id. Simonson notes that taxpayers in the $15,000-$50,000 income range send in 75% of all
tax returns that itemize deductions, even though that income group constitutes only 43% of
all returns.
91.

HALL AND RABUSKA, supra note 10, at 93. Hall and Rabushka have tabulated the tax bur-

den shift by income groups:
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participants in our economy." 92 Dr. Rabushka feels that citizens
outside Capitol Hill care more about simplicity than about tax burden
shifts, and he also feels they demand that equal-income taxpayers
should pay equal taxes.93 Because he believes that a taxpayer's real
disposable income will increase under the Hall-Rabushka bill, and because the penalty of higher tax rates for extra dollars earned will disappear, Rabushka thinks people "will spend less time worrying about the
tax consequences of their actions and will concentrate instead on earning higher incomes."9 4
Other flat-rate advocates contend that "the question of who would
pay more under a flat-rate system is trivial next to the question of who
loses now under the current system."9 5 Norman B. Ture believes that
tax policy should treat all taxpayers the same, "which calls for offending everyone when taxes must be raised."9 6 Ture believes that marginally progressive tax rates purport to partially equalize the distribution
of wealth.97 He contends that the current code fails this purpose, and
argues that if a tax system attempts to redistribute income, the best
approach calls for effectively graduated rates.9" Therefore, Ture argues
in favor of a flat-rate tax with personal exemptions and a standard deduction because such a system would actually achieve progressivity. 9 9
Ture concludes that "there clearly is no objection on grounds of fairness or income distribution against a flat or single marginal rate."' 0 0
Augmented
Income
$

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

5,687

Current
Tax
$

247

Simple Tax
(19% Flat Rate)
$

440

Changes as a
% of Income
3.4%

11,635

905

1,494

5.1

17,629
21,244

1,726
2,446

2,535
3,166

4.6
4.3

33,505
44,196
58,753
88,750

4,286
6,532
10,333
18,640

5,404
7,417
10,182
15,879

3.3
2.0
-0.3
-3.1

251,870
691,239
1,792,476

67,973
202,384
577,080

46,870
130,382
339,652

-8.4
-10.4
-13.2

Id. at 125.
Id. at 93. The authors of Low TAX continue: "[within seven years, we foresee a 9% increase
in real incomes on account of the simple tax, almost double its immediate tax increase for
any group." Id.
Interview with Dr. Alvin Rabushka, supra note 49.
HALL AND RABUSHKA, 4 Simple Income Tax with Low MarginalRates, 17-18 (1982).
Lee, Rating the fNat-Rate Tax, Wall St. J., June 30, 1982, at 22, col. 4. The writer concludes
that the "loser" under the current system is the nation's economy, "meaning all of us."
Ture, supra note 42, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Technical Problems
Both the Bradley-Gephardt and Hall-Rabushka proposals have
other controversial effects that the authors may or may not have intended. Although these effects arise from technical aspects, they have
serious political ramifications.
First, the Bradley-Gephardt proposal does not index to inflation.' 0 '
Kenneth Simonson states that the Bradley-Gephardt bill's "repeal of
indexing means that individual income taxes would rise faster than
under present law." 1 °2 Opponents of the bill argue that the supposed
eighty percent of all taxpayers who would start out paying the fourteen
percent tax rate under the Bradley-Gephardt bill would soon have to
10 3
pay the top rate of thirty percent due to inflation.
Second, the Bradley-Gephardt bill does not integrate personal and
corporate income taxes. The bill's failure to integrate these income
taxes illustrates that not all tax reformers believe, as Hall and
Rabushka do, that income should be taxed only once."° Flat-rate advocates emphasize that double taxation under the Bradley-Gephardt
proposal could possibly result in a fifty-one percent tax rate on corporate profits.' 0 5 Rabushka asserts that this feature provides a disincentive to investors.' °6
The United States Chamber of Commerce contends that double
taxation distorts business decisions by forcing businesses to consider
tax consequences in deciding whether or not to incorporate. 01 7 While
the Chamber of Commerce advocates taxing income only once, it cautions that "achieving integration of corporate and individual taxation is
not a straightforward task."'0 8
Third, the Hall-Rabushka bill eliminates home mortgage interest
and charitable deductions. This elimination has raised significant objection to the Hall-Rabushka proposal because so many taxpayers presently benefit from the write-offs." ° To allay the fears of homeowners
and other debtors, Hall and Rabushka argue that interest rates will
101. S. 1421, supra note 3, at 7839.
102. Hearings, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 3. Simonson adds that income taxes under the BradleyGephardt bill would not rise as fast as under the current rate structure if the present system
was not indexed to inflation because the broader fair tax brackets lessen "bracket creep." Id.
103. Interview with Dr. Alvin Rabushka, supra note 49.
104. Rabushka says that separate corporate and personal income tax systems perpetuate double
taxation, whereby income is taxed once as corporate profit, and a second time in the shareholders' hands as a dividend. Id.
105. The fair tax applies a 30% rate to corporate profits. If the corporation distributed the 70%
income remaining to a shareholder in the top 30% bracket, the I.R.S. would collect another
21% of the original corporate profit. Id.
106. Id.
107. Hearings, supra note 89, at 212.
108. Id. Mr. Simonson, of the Chamber of Commerce, argues that increasing the $100 dividend
exclusion would alleviate the present code's double taxation. "Congress should not adopt a
tax plan which eliminates this exclusion unless it provides other relief from double taxation
of corporate income." Id.
109. HALL AND RABUSHKA, supra note 10, at 60-66.
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drop as a result of their bill. 0 They believe that the current deduction
for interest paid and the tax on interest earned sustains today's high
interest rates. Enactment of their plan would mean that borrowers
would no longer tolerate high interest payments and lenders would
have to lower their interest rates to attract borrowers. When interest
deductions no longer offset the cost of owning a home, purchase prices
will stabilize for prospective home buyers."' Current homeowners
who would lose the substantial interest deduction for their fixed interest
payments would find little comfort in lower future rates. Rabushka
admits this inequity and concedes that current homeowners with high
interest payments would join the few12 but inevitable losers among the
many winners of a new tax system.
The Hall-Rabushka proposal would also exclude charitable contribution deductions. Hall and Rabushka argue that the charitable deduction should not enjoy the preferred status afforded by the BradleyGephardt proposal. They point out that the current deduction does not
motivate the bulk of charitable contributions.'
Hall and Rabushka
also assert that public subsidy for certain organizations should depend
on the intrinsic merit of such groups, not on the deductibility of contributions to them." 4 For example, in 1979, charitable contributions of
cash and volunteer work totalled ninety-four billion dollars.'
Charitable contribution deductions for that year amounted to only twentyfour billion dollars." 6 Hall and Rabushka therefore conclude that,
even without a charitable deduction in 1979, seventy billion dollars of
contributions would have been made." 17
The charitable deduction is one of the most difficult deductions to
judge on its merits." 8 Rudolph G. Penner, economist and tax analyst
for the American Enterprise Institute who supports the flat-rate tax,
stated that because of public sentiment, "whatever happens to the
rest
'' 1 9
of the tax system, the charitable deduction is likely to remain.
Fourth, the Hall-Rabushka bill's first-year investment write-off for
businesses applies only to new assets. The bill has caused a stir among
small businessmen who often cannot afford to buy new plant facilities
and machinery. Small businesses and other purchasers of used goods
110. Id. See also Jacobs, A Flat Tax Can Help Growth Firms, Wall St. J., July 12, 1983, at 38, col.
4.
111. HALL AND RABUSHKA, supra note 10, at 62-66. See also Everett, Flatteningthe Personal
Income Tax, CHASE ECONOMIC OBSERVER 3-5 (Mar.-Apr. 1983). Everett writes that the loss
of a deduction sustained by homeowners will engender a potent source of political resistance.
112. Debate between Dr. Alvin Rabushka and Dean David T. Link of the Notre Dame Law
School, The Flat-Rate Tax, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 3, 1983).
113. HALL AND RABUSHKA, supra note 10, at 66.
114. Id. at 78.

115. Id. at 66.
116. Id.
117. Id.

118. Hearings, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 33 (statement by Rudolph G. Penner, American Enterprise
Institute).
119. Id.
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would have to bear the cost of replacing declining assets without a corresponding deduction. To explain why they limit the write-off, Hall
claims that purchases of old equipment often result in "financial manipulations" rather than additions to capital stock. 2 0 Under the HallRabushka plan, an asset's first owner would have already taken a
write-off against income. 12 1 Such an explanation does little to comfort
small businesmen who would not be able to expand their business
through capital stock purchases without a corresponding tax write-off.
The Uphill Political Battle
The fundamental question concerning the future of the HallRabushka and Bradley-Gephardt plans is whether Congress will seriously consider installing a new tax system. Realistically, neither taxreform proposal has overwhelming taxpayer support, even though most
people agree that major tax reform is overdue.
Some analysts feel that the current tax system holds too much complexity for anyone to accurately forecast the effects of a major revision.
Additionally, the costs associated with tax reform generally fall on
identifiable groups, some of which have committed themselves to fight
tax reforms with uncertain and intangible benefits. 122 As an advocate
of the Bradley-Gephardt plan, Common Cause recognizes these hurdles: "[uinder normal circumstances, the Bradley-Gephardt proposal
would have no chance of passage.
The question is whether the present
123
circumstances are normal."'
Although the Reagan Administration philosophically believes the
flat-rate tax has merit, the White House has not spent much time considering tax reform. 2 4 The administration strongly supports lower tax
rates and a simpler tax code, but because of the politically powerful
interests enjoying and lobbying for preferred tax status today, administration 25officials consider a fiat-rate tax "practically impossible" to
enact.1
Similarly, after counting 110 tax expenditures in the present code,
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported that "[t]he biggest obstacle to any simplified tax system is that it, quite simply, goes against
the grain of a Congress that has found it irresistible to use the tax code
to dole out favors and to implement new programs without direct
spending."' 2 6 The home mortgage interest and charitable deductions
represent particularly difficult tax preferences to eliminate. Because
the Bradley-Gephardt bill retains these deductions, as well as other de120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Brimelow, Get Rid ofthe Creep, Barron's, April 12, 1982, at 9.
Id.
Hitchner, supra note 78, at 25.
Id.
Telephone interview with Ed Dale, Assistant Director for Public Affairs of the White House
(Aug. 26, 1983).
125. Id.
126. Fessler, supra note 41, at 1334.
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ductions commonly used by taxpayers, the bill may be politically easier
to pass than the Hall-Rabushka proposal.
On the other hand, because the Bradley-Gephardt plan retains certain tax expenditures, other interest groups may try to add to the preference list in favor of themselves, only to return the tax system to its
present complexity.'2 7 The Hall-Rabushka bill adopts an absolute
stance by not allowing any deductions except for the personal exemption, dependency deduction, and zero bracket amounts. According to
Herman Kahn, chairman of the Hudson Insitute, a plan with no exceptions results in wholesale tax reform.' 2 8 Kahn believes that fewer special preferences helps Congress combat special interests.' 29 The HallRabushka bill, however, carries the political liability of significant
changes in tax distribution.
Simply passing a flat-rate tax over the resistance of special interests
may not reduce the pressures for tax breaks. 3 ' The reality of our special-interest-laden tax code prompts Common Cause to declare that
"equity in the current code is more theoretical than real. In practice, it
distributes tax liabilities more in accordance with the political strength
of special interests than with a rational conception of equity.""'' The
Bradley-Gephardt and Hall-Rabushka bills purport to eliminate political favoritism in varying degrees by laying to rest certain deductions,
exclusions, and exceptions. By doing so, both bills boldly challenge the
benefactors of tax preferences while urging the benefactors' support for
a more broadly-based tax system. For example, the Hall-Rabushka bill
may result in significant tax burden increases to large, defined income
groups, as well as elimination of most deductions, exclusions, and exceptions. Economist Rudolph Penner remarked that "[u]nder any flatrate system, what you find is that a very large number of people would
pay a bit more, and a very small number
would pay radically less.
'32
That's not a good formula politically."'
Tax Reform and the Deficit
Counterbalancing the political infeasibility of major tax reform is
the potential the Bradley-Gephardt and Hall-Rabushka proposals have
for significantly reducing or perhaps even eliminating the huge federal
budget deficits,' 3 3 which are perceived by many analysts to be the
127. See id
128. Id.
129. Herman Kahn urges: "Itlhis is going to have to be a fight of the whole country vs. the special
interests." ld.
130. McIntyre, supra note 55. For example, McIntyre notes that "corporate tax breaks are the
fastest growing item in the Reagan budget. . . and will double between 1981 and 1985."
Id.
131. Hitchner, supra note 78, at 23.
132. The Flat-Rate Tax.: an Old Idea with New Appeal, Bus. WK., July 19, 1982, at 130.
133. The deficit for fiscal year 1983 was approximately $200 billion. Budget Solution, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 14, 1983, at 33, col. 1. Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman has
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greatest single threat to continuing economic recovery.' 3 4 The Joint
Committee on Taxation has concluded that a flat-rate tax similar to
that proposed by Hall and Rabushka would expand the tax base approximately sixty percent' 3 5 by eliminating all deductions, credits, and
exclusions, except for strictly defined business and occupational expenses. 136 Many observers believe that such a set-up would be "a
budget balancer's paradise."' 3 7 According to Joseph J. Minarik, a fiat
rate of twelve percent applied to the expanded tax base described above
in fiscal year 1983 would have produced revenues roughly equivalent
to those collected under the present tax structure, and that an eighteen
percent flat rate would have balanced the budget.' 38 Slightly less optimistic are the estimates of Hall and Rabushka themselves, who projected that a simple across-the-board rate of nineteen percent would
have shrunk the deficit to $29 billion in fiscal year 1984 and virtually
wiped out the deficit by 1985.139
The Bradley-Gephardt proposal is intended by its sponsors to be
revenue-neutral; 4° nonetheless, adjustments in the proposed tax rates
could be made to accommodate the goals of a balanced budget without
doing violence
to the base-broadening and rate-reducing objectives of
14 1
the bill.

Given congressional reluctance to make additional spending cuts,
the prospect of increasingly large, recovery-threatening deficits, and the
fact that no one wants to raise tax rates to balance the budget, influential officials such as CBO director Alice Rivlin have concluded that "a

134.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

140.
141.

been quoted as projecting $200 billion deficits "as far as the eye can see." Jones, SingleMinded Devotion to Tax Reductions Courts Disaster, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1983, at 31, col. 1.
See Jones, supra note 133, for an even more dire view of the danger of budget deficits. But
see Budget Solution, supra note 133; Ture, What Really Does the Crowding Out, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 14, 1983, at 33, at col. 4, which expresses the point of view that current budget deficits
are not as yet a substantial threat to economic recovery.
See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 4. See also HALL AND
RABUSHKA, supra note 10, at 14-15.
S. 557, supra note 3.
See generally Wilson, Flat Tax Fever, DUN'S BUSINESS MONTH, November 1982, at 34-35.
Id.
HALL AND RABUSHKA, supra note 10, at 126-27. Their projections are based on the President's February 1982, budget estimates. Even under the more pessimistic projection of expenditures included in the 1982 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline budget report,
Hall and Rabushka's 19% flat rate would bring the budget deficit down to well below $100
billion by fiscal year 1987, as opposed to the CBO's projection of a nearly $250 billion
shortfall.
See Bradley Press Release, supra note 37.
The Joint Committee on Taxation explained this adjustment process as follows:
One of the key decisions which must be made in analyzing or designing a comprehensive tax proposal is the choice of a revenue target. Clearly, if there is substantial
base broadening with no changes in marginal tax rates, total revenue will be increased, and if marginal tax rates are lowered without changing the tax base, total
revenue will be reduced. Several of the proposals appear to be designed so that the
new combination of tax rates and tax base would produce approximately the same
revenue as is expected under present law for either 1983 or 1984. However, if a judgment is made that this level is either too low or too high, base broadening and tax rate
decisions can be adjusted accordingly.
STAFF OF JOINT COMMirrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 4.
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broad-based, low-rate income tax has the potential to provide badly
needed tax revenue."'' 1 2 If this line of reasoning is valid, then the pressures of enormous budget deficits and the unpleasantness of the alternatives may lead many members of Congress and officials within the
executive branch to take a much closer look at the Bradley-Gephardt
and Hall-Rabushka bills as possible vehicles for bringing the deficit
problem under control.
CONCLUSION
The Wall Street Journalcommented after President Reagan's 1984
State of the Union Address that the current tax code will grow even
more complex before Congress enacts any serious measures to simplify
taxes.14 3 In response, Dr. Rabushka predicted that "you can expect lots
of tax-simplification studies, lots of talk and no action this year or
next."' 4 Rabushka's outlook for tax reform in the coming months
feeds his conviction45that our tax system needs a complete overhaul, not
just simplification.
Although the Hall-Rabushka and Bradley-Gephardt bills contain
significant differences, a coalition of both bills' sponsors can speed the
process toward a tax system overhaul. Dr. Rabushka has stated that he
certainly favors the Bradley-Gephardt plan over the current Internal
Revenue Code, and would indeed support it for the immediate future if
the sponsors change certain provisions. 146 First, Rabushka would require that the Bradley-Gephardt bill index its rate brackets to inflation;
second, the bill must integrate the corporate and individual taxes to
eliminate double taxation; and finally, the Bradley-Gephardt proposal
must reinstate capital gains treatment to avoid a disincentive to saving
and investment. 4 7 Rabushka predicts that once taxpayers realize the
economic boom from such a tax system they will want to lower rates
further and broaden the tax base even more. 48 Consequently, Congress could smoothly usher in a flat-rate tax like the Hall-Rabushka
bill, thus completing the metamorphosis of the tax system. 149
Congress can no longer avoid overhauling the tax system simply
because it threatens special-interest constituencies. The BradleyGephardt bill, with adjustments suggested by Dr. Rabushka, represents
the most feasible plan of tax reform. The integration of certain provisions from the two bills may encourage the sponsors of other tax reform
bills to band together behind the Bradley-Gephardt/Hall-Rabushka
hybrid. Meaningful tax reform will be accomplished expeditiously
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Tax Report, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
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only if reform-minded groups cooperate and contribute their support
and ideas toward a common tax overhaul goal, rather than diffuse their
efforts by advocating their own individual bills.
Dr. Rabushka's prediction that no significant tax reform steps will
be taken this year or next seems almost certain to come true due to the
upcoming elections. 5 ' Although Congress may not soon enact any tax
proposal, the Hall-Rabushka and Bradley-Gephardt bills will have
"performed a useful service for the economy and for tax fairness""'if
they can focus national attention on the need to purge the tax code of
arbitrary loopholes and preferences.
Michael G. Oddo*

150. Since Dr. Rabushka's statements on the future of tax changes, however, another proposal has
emerged, even though it has not yet been introduced into Congress. On March 2, 1984,
Representative Jack Kemp, R-N.Y., and Senator Robert Kasten, R-Wis., announced that
they have collaborated on a tax-reform package with a twenty-five percent top rate. Kemp
unveiled the plan to the Conservative Political Action Committee in Washington, D.C. A
copy of their proposal was not available in time for consideration in this note. The KempKasten proposal resembles the Bradley-Gephardt bill in that it retains a progressive rate
structure and purports to maintain the current tax-burden distribution by income group.
Unlike the Bradley-Gephardt bill, Kemp and Kasten's tax plan would index its brackets to
inflation, which is significant in light of the author's support for Rabushka's adjustments to
the Fair Tax. See Bradley-Kemp-Reagan?, Wall St. J., March 5, 1984, at 30, col. I.
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